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Abstract

Cost estimators use a variety of methods to develop estimates at completion
(EACs) and new methods continue to be developed. Research has shown there is no best
method for computing EACs for all acquisition contracts. However, some methods
perform better under specific circumstances. In 2009, Captain Trahan investigated the
use of a Gompertz growth model for developing EACs. She found that this method is
more reliable for Over Target Baseline (OTB) contracts than the standard indexed based
approaches. Captain Trahan’s model is an excellent model to use for OTB contracts or
contracts with a high likelihood of becoming an OTB contract. In this study, we attempt
to develop a model that predicts whether an acquisition contract is likely to become an
OTB. By identifying contracts that are likely to become OTB, we can apply the
Gompertz growth model to develop better EACs. Furthermore, an OTB, by definition,
recognizes a cost overrun. Therefore, the ability to predict OTBs would allow us to
understand what may cause cost overruns. However, our models indicate that we are
unable to predict an OTB. This indicates that the OTB process may be used randomly
which leads us to question the benefits of OTBs.
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PREDICTING OVER TARGET BASELINE (OTB)
ACQUISITION CONTRACTS

I: Introduction
Background
Approximately twenty percent of all acquisition contracts in the DoD experienced
cost overruns over the past 20 years (based on analysis dataset). An Over Target
Baseline (OTB) formally recognizes these cost overruns. By examining eighty percent of
contracts between 1990 and 2005 for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), we
identify over $26 billion in cost overruns (BY09$). The average cost overrun for each
contract experiencing an OTB is $321 million (BY09$).
Since cost overruns are a major concern for the entire Department of Defense, it is
important to understand why they occur. Two potential reasons for cost overruns are: 1)
The existing cost estimates are not accurate to begin with which leads to the actual costs
being far from the estimate and 2) Program costs are not effectively controlled to prevent
overruns. Solutions to these problems include improving the original cost estimates,
improving our control mechanisms for acquisition programs, and managing factors that
lead to cost overruns. The DoD uses the Earned Value Management (EVM) system for
monitoring and controlling acquisition programs. EVM requires the reporting of cost,
schedule, and performance metrics for large acquisition systems. Two important EVM
metrics determine how a program is doing and whether or not a program must make
changes to get back on track. The Cost Performance Index (CPI) tells management
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officials whether or not a program is experiencing cost overruns to date and the Schedule
Performance Index (SPI) tells management officials whether or not a program is currently
behind schedule or not.
In order to ascertain whether a program will experience cost overruns at
completion, it is necessary to know the Budget at Completion (BAC) and the Estimate at
Completion (EAC). We can determine if a program will experience cost overruns by
comparing the budgeted amount for a program (BAC) to the estimated cost at completion
(EAC). Particularly, contracts experience a cost overrun at completion, also known as a
variance at completion (VAC), when the EAC is larger than the BAC.
Determining the BAC is straightforward as it represents the planned amount of
money allocated to a specific program and it is the amount included in the budget.
However, developing the EAC is not as straightforward. The EAC is an estimate for
what the program will actually cost once all of the work is completed. There is a vast
amount of research in the area of developing accurate EACs. Some methods work better
than others and several methods only work well under specific circumstances. Based on
past research, it is not clear that there is one superior method of developing an accurate
EAC for all acquisition contracts.
To improve the accuracy of EACs, cost estimators can focus on those programs
where a specific estimating method performs better. By applying these superior
estimating methods properly, cost estimators can develop EACs that are more accurate.
In this thesis, we investigate the use of one of these methods in particular. In 2009,
Captain Trahan investigated the use of growth models as a tool to develop better EACs in
her AFIT thesis. She found that the growth model she applied to acquisition contracts
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performed superior to the standard indexed based approaches for developing EACs 71%
of the time for Over Target Baseline (OTB) contracts (Trahan, 2009). Therefore, her
method may provide a more accurate EAC for a specific type of acquisition contract:
OTB contracts.
Finally, the DoD can address cost overruns by identifying the factors that lead to
cost overruns and properly managing these factors. We can try to identify these factors
by using statistical models that quantify the relationships between overruns and a variety
of factors. While this thesis focuses on the topic of OTBs, it is important to recognize
that an OTB is not only a special case of contracts, but an OTB also identifies a cost
overrun. Based on the analysis of contracts in our dataset, there have been over $17
billion in cost overruns related to OTBs since 2000. The ability to identify factors related
to OTBs provides insight into what may lead to cost overruns for the DoD.
Purpose of this Study
This study has two purposes: 1) Develop better EACs and 2) Predict whether an
OTB would occur, which signifies a recognized cost overrun. To focus on our goal of
developing better EACs, we would like to apply Captain Trahan’s growth models to OTB
contracts. However, cost estimators do not always know whether a contract will become
an OTB contract. An over target baseline (OTB) occurs when the original baseline, in
terms of costs, becomes unrealistic and for a variety of reasons the program ends up with
a revised baseline for measurement purposes. Consequently, a program may be
converted to an OTB and receive a new baseline later on in the program’s life. To use
Captain Trahan’s models, we would like to know not only what contracts are currently
OTB contracts, but also what contracts have a high likelihood of becoming an OTB
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contract. If we can accurately predict which contracts have a high likelihood of
becoming OTB contracts, we can apply Captain Trahan’s growth models to these
programs to develop EACs that are more accurate.
This thesis attempts to build a model that predicts whether a contract is likely to
become an OTB contract. The output of this model provides indicators as to what
influences the likelihood of a contract being an OTB and hence experiencing a cost
overrun. The output also allows us to develop better EACs for contracts that we identify
as likely to be an OTB.
In military acquisitions, it is imperative to have EACs that are more accurate;
otherwise, the DoD loses out on content. To elaborate, having too high of an EAC means
that the DoD may be unable to fund other programs that the war fighter may need.
Conversely, by having too low of an EAC, there will be issues developing and producing
an essential program due to a lack of sufficient funds. Furthermore, if one program needs
additional funding, decision makers may decide to borrow from another program, which
in turn has the potential to stunt progress on both programs.
Using logistic regression models, we can try to find the best predictors that
estimate how likely a contract is to become an OTB contract. These predictors may
range from cost and schedule performance indicators to a variety of qualitative
characteristics of the program. The implications of an effective model for predicting
OTBs are substantial. Not only would this tell us if a contract is on the path to
experiencing cost overruns, but it also allows us to develop better EACs.
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Study Process
Our study begins by developing a better understanding of the requirements and
importance of Earned Value Management (EVM) and its associated performance metrics.
Then we look at research related to developing EACs and the issues associated with
different estimating methods. That section also includes an in depth look at the OTB
process. In the Data and Methodology section, we describe the sources of data for this
study and the purpose of logistic regression models. Lastly, the results and the
implications of these results are in Chapters IV and V.
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II: Literature Review

Introduction
This chapter provides a better understanding of the concepts of Earned Value
Management (EVM) and Over Target Baselines (OTBs). We first look at why analysts
use EVM and discuss some of the important EVM performance measures and indices
within EVM. The next step is to examine how Estimates at Completion (EACs) are
calculated and look briefly at some of the past EAC research. Then we look specifically
at calculating EACs using the Gompertz growth model as it pertains to Over Target
Baseline (OTB) contracts. Since the Gompertz growth model provides us with a superior
method of calculating EACs specifically for OTBs, we also study the OTB process and
the typical characteristics of OTB contracts. Finally, we look at how other studies utilize
logistic regression models and discuss the use of a logistic regression model for
predicting OTBs, which allows cost estimators to predict cost overruns and calculate
EACs that are more accurate.
Earned Value Management (EVM)
The Air Force Cost Analysis Handbook describes the primary purpose of Earned
Value Management as:
Earned Value Management (EVM) is a tool that provides Government and
contractor system Program Managers (PMs) visibility into the technical, cost, and
schedule performance of their projects, as well as the capability to mitigate the
risks of a program not meeting its time, budget, and performance goals. (Air
Force Cost Analysis Agency, 2007)
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) dictates that an earned value management
system is required for all major federal acquisition programs (GSA FAR Secretariat,
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2009). Specifically the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
states that each cost or incentive acquisition contract in the DoD exceeding $20 million is
required to adhere to the EVM standards and each contract exceeding $50 million is
required to have a DCMA validated EVM system (Department of Defense, 2009).
Furthermore, the DoD adopted the industry standards for EVM, the ANSI/EIA 748
standards, which includes 32 measures that acquisition programs must adhere to.
Within the EVM framework, each contract for an acquisition program has a
performance measurement baseline (PMB) which is the time-phased budget for the
contract. It includes the costs associated with all of the planned work packages for the
specific contract. The Budget at Completion (BAC) for a contract is the total budgeted
amount that encompasses all of the required work from start to finish. As the contract
progresses and work is completed, the contractors, as well as the government, develop
estimates at completion (EACs) which are revised projections of what the contract will
cost at completion. Analysts compare the EACs to the PMB to measure contract
performance and to determine the likelihood of completing a contract within the original
budget. If the EAC is greater than the BAC (the PMB at completion), this is a positive
Variance at Completion (VAC) and the program office expects to incur costs in excess of
the amount budgeted for. Figure 1 shows the PMB, EAC, and BAC.

7

Figure 1: Performance Measurement Baseline (Christensen, 1999)

While the Variance at Completion tracks performance at the point of contract
completion, there are performance indices that track performance throughout the project.
The Cost Performance Index (CPI) tracks whether or not the amount of money spent on
the contract is more that the amount budgeted for at a given point in time. The Schedule
Performance Index (SPI) tracks whether or not the amount of work scheduled is complete
at a given point in time. The Schedule Cost Index, which is the product of the SPI and
CPI, reflects both schedule and cost performance. The Composite Index combines the
SPI and CPI by specifying weights for the cost performance (CPI) and schedule
performance (SPI). These four indices are in Table 1.
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Table 1: EVM Performance Indices

CPI= Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP)
Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP)
SPI = Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP)
Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS)
SCI =

CPI * SPI

Composite Index = (w1*CPI) + (w2*SPI)
Developing Estimates at Completion (EACs)
The PMB is easy to identify, it is simply the given budget for the contract less the
management reserve. However, there is a variety of ways to calculate the EAC.
Regardless of how the EAC is calculated, it is important to know that it is accurate in
determining the likely cost at completion. Furthermore, the accuracy of the EAC is
important for cost estimators when they are comparing the EAC with the PMB to
determine if they are experiencing cost overruns or not. A variety of methods for
computing EACs are available and numerous studies have analyzed how effective each
method is at producing accurate EACs.
The most commonly used method of calculating an EAC is an indexed based
approach. This approach is simplistic and produces an EAC rather quickly. Analysts
calculate the EAC by taking the sum of two items: 1) The actual cost of work performed
(ACWP) and 2) The remaining work, which is the Budget at Completion (BAC) minus
the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP), divided by a performance index. The
first part of the formula, ACWP, represents the amount of money spent on the project to
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date. The second part represents the estimate for remaining work. By dividing the
amount of work remaining, BAC minus BCWP, by a performance factor, we arrive at our
estimate for how much the remaining work will cost. This assumes that future
performance will be similar to past performance. The performance index used in this
computation is usually the CPI, SPI, SCI, or a composite index (Christensen, 1994).
While the indexed based method is the most commonly used way to calculate EACs,
more complex methods are available that utilize forecasting techniques such as regression
and time series analysis.
In 1995, Dr. Christensen reviewed 25 EAC studies. In this review, he
summarized two types of studies: 1) studies that provided new techniques for developing
EACs and 2) studies that compared a variety of techniques to determine which techniques
provided better EACs. His review incorporates index-based methods, time series
techniques, performance factors, and regression approaches. When Dr. Christensen
looked at the comparison studies, he concluded, “The accuracy of regression-based
models over index-based formulas has not been established…additional research
exploring the potential of regression analysis as a forecasting tool is badly needed”
(Christensen, 1995). This was due primarily to the fact that most studies had small
sample sizes and some studies provided inconclusive results. Furthermore, he stated,
“The accuracy of index based formulas depends on the type of system and the stage and
phase of the contract” (Christensen, 1995). Dr. Christensen’s review of EAC research in
1995 indicates that there is no best method for developing EACs for all contracts. These
conclusions make a strong case for the use of specific forecasting methods that perform
better under specific circumstances.
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Following Dr. Christensen’s review of EAC research, several studies investigated
the use of regression models. In 2005, Captain Steven Tracy used multiple regression to
develop EACs at five different points throughout the life of a contract. He developed five
different regression models which utilize anywhere from three to six predictors each in
forecasting the EAC. His results indicate that “the regression models generally dominate
the performance with the early models, 25 and 35 percent complete, and begin to trade
‘best’ performance with the index based models at the 50 and 65 percent complete
points” (Tracy, 2005). Therefore, Captain Tracy’s thesis shows that regression models
might be able to outperform index methods, but only at certain times, a conclusion
similar to that of Dr. Christensen’s in 1995.
Developing EACs Using a Growth Model
Similar to other recent efforts, in 2009 Captain Trahan attempted to find a
superior method for developing EACs in her AFIT thesis. She examined the tendency for
Air Force acquisition contracts to incur costs in an “S” shaped manner. That is, a
contract tends to incur costs slowly at the beginning of its life, and then costs rapidly
accrue until they taper off at the end. Based on this trend, she investigated the use of the
Gompertz growth curves as models to predict the EAC for a contract as these curves
exhibit an “S” shape. Figure 2 is an example of a growth curve that she applied.
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Figure 2: Development Growth Model (Trahan, 2009)

Using JMP®, Captain Trahan developed growth models of the functional form
provided in Table 2. Based on the models she developed with specific values for α, β and
γ, she could calculate the contract’s growth in spending based on the percent time
complete. Using this estimated amount of growth, she calculated the EAC for each
contract with the second formula in Table 2.
Table 2: EAC Formula Using Growth Model (Trahan, 2009)

Gompertz Growth:

GG(X) = α(exp(-exp(β-γ*X)))

EAC:

EAC(X) = ACWP(X) + [ (GG(1) – GG(X))*BAC]

Once she developed three growth models for production contracts, development
contracts, and mixed contracts (both development and production combined in one
model), she compared the EAC estimates from the growth model to the actual costs at
completion. She also compared the EAC estimates from using index-based approaches to
the actual costs of completion. By using the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE),
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which compares the estimates to the actual costs, she was able to compare the predictive
capability of the Gompertz growth curve EACs to the index based EACs. The formula
used for calculating the MAPE is in Table 3.
Table 3: MAPE Comparison (Trahan, 2009)

Absolute Percentage Error
APE = Abs [ (EAC – TAC) / TAC ]
Mean Absolute Percentage
MAPE = ( Σ APE) / n
Error
EAC = Estimate at Completion; TAC = Total at Completion; n =
number of contracts
Based on the MAPE comparisons for the Gompertz growth models and the index
based models she concluded, “No best model exists [for all contracts] but our growth
models present a better model than the popular index-based methods currently in use for
estimating OTB contracts specifically” (Trahan, 2009). These results are similar to the
findings of Dr. Christiansen and Captain Tracy in that this growth model may not be
superior to the index based models in all cases, but this model does perform better in
specific circumstances, primarily for OTB contracts. Furthermore, “this new
methodology adds a unique perspective and consistently performs more accurately
compared to the CPI, SCI, and Composite Index-based [methods] on an average of 71%
of unique OTB contracts” (Trahan, 2009).
Since Captain Trahan’s method of forecasting EACs is superior for OTB
contracts, this thesis focuses on OTB contracts. We attempt to build models that identify
contracts that are likely to become OTB. Once these models predict which contracts are
likely to be OTB contracts, we can use the methods employed by Captain Trahan to
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develop better EACs. However, we must first understand what it means for a contract to
be an OTB.
Cost Overruns and the OTB Process
Based on our analysis of contracts in the Defense Acquisition Executive
Summary (DAES) database, twenty percent of the DoD’s acquisition contracts are not
completed within their allocated budgets (CBB). When a contract exceeds its allocated
budget, it is termed a cost overrun. When a contract is behind schedule, it is a schedule
overrun. While schedule overruns are common, the emphasis in the DoD tends to be on
cost overruns.
Program managers can adjust the performance measurement baseline (PMB) in
three major ways. Depending on the type of adjustment to the PMB, the contractor may
recognize a cost overrun. The “three major categories [are]: authorized contract changes,
internal re-planning, and inadequate remaining budget in the contract with a resulting
requirement for an OTB” (Cukr, 2001). The first two categories are standard and require
a minimal amount of work to remedy the situation in comparison to an OTB (Cukr,
2001). On the other hand, the process for implementing an Over Target Baseline (OTB)
is very complex and an OTB implies that the acquisition program is in considerable
trouble.
Authorized contract changes include additional requirements or deviations that
each organization allows based on changes in the scope of the work. Authorized contract
changes also include changes in the PMB related to work increments that did not
originally have costs associated with them (un-priced work packages). The contractor
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adds these additional costs to the PMB as if they were included in the original baseline.
These authorized changes do not indicate a cost overrun.
The second category, internal re-planning, occurs when the remaining work
requires a new plan and certain work breakdown structure (WBS) elements may be
experiencing cost overruns. In this case, the contractor can develop a new plan for the
entire contract that is within the original budget. This prevents a cost overrun from
occurring for the contract.
Finally, an Over Target Baseline occurs when the work scope does not change
and the contractor cannot complete the remaining work within the original budget (Cukr,
2001). According to the DAU’s handbook on OTBs:
An OTB is a contract budget base that was formally reprogrammed to include
additional performance management budget and which therefore exceeds the
contract target cost… [And] ANSI/EIA-748-1998 defines it as ‘a recovery plan, a
new baseline for management when the original objectives cannot be met and new
goals are needed for management purposes.’ (Defense Acquisition University,
2003)
When an OTB is used, the program manager is recognizing a cost overrun.
In the process of implementing an OTB, a new PMB is developed and the cost
and schedule variances are set to zero. This allows program managers to obtain a clean
slate to work with. While this seems to make an OTB the preferred method for dealing
with substantial cost overruns in defense acquisition programs, contractors do not always
utilize an OTB. The OTB process is a lengthy 10-step process that can be very costly and
take many months to complete. These additional costs are associated with the
implementation of an OTB and are over and above the overrun costs that a contract has
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already incurred prior to the OTB. Furthermore, any time spent on the OTB process may
delay progress made on the contract itself.
The Defense Acquisition University publishes the OTB/OTS handbook that
describes in detail the ten steps in the OTB process. Figure 3 illustrates this process. The
first step in the process is identifying the need for an OTB since it is not a required
action. Then, the contractor reviews the remaining work and revises the schedules and
cost estimates. After several reviews, the contractor and the government agree to the
revised schedules and costs, which become the new PMB.

Figure 3: The OTB Process Flow (DAU, 2003)
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While the contractor is ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the PMB, “The
customer project manager [who is typically the program manager within the DoD] and
business office will ultimately be held accountable for the significant changes an
OTB/OTS can effect” (DAU, 2003). Therefore, the OTB process is typically a joint
effort between the supplier (the contractor) and the customer (program office or DoD
representative for the contract).
When a contract establishes a new baseline through the OTB process, it is a wakeup call to the program and the program manager. The decision to establish this new
baseline implies that contract performance is out of hand and drastic changes are
necessary to correct for deficiencies and to prevent the reoccurrence of past problems.
The process of making a contract an OTB contract ensures that there is a true need for an
OTB rather than establishing a new baseline just on the basis of improving EVM
performance indices. Furthermore, an OTB establishes a realistic plan and a baseline for
the remaining work, which the contractors must follow. Historically, some of the reasons
provided for updating the PMB using an OTB include:








Estimate at Completion (EAC) is less than actual costs for some elements
Existence of zero budget work packages
Cost and schedule variance explanations are no longer meaningful
Inability to effectively use the performance data
Unrealistic activity durations and relationship logic
Depletion or rapid use of management reserve
Lack of Confidence in contractor’s EAC
(Tiffany, 2004)
Due to the low probability of identifying all of the expected problems for a

contract and the inability to capture realistic estimates early on, contractors do not
typically use OTBs early in a contract’s life. Additionally, OTBs are not practical late in
17

a contract’s life as the time and money invested in developing a new baseline exceeds the
potential benefits from having a new baseline late in a contract’s life. Typically, a
contract is only rebaselined through an OTB once, therefore, it is important to get the
new baseline right. While an OTB provides a contractor with the opportunity to establish
new and realistic goals, the contractor and program office must consider it carefully to
ensure that the benefits of a new baseline outweigh the costs incurred during the OTB
process. The purpose of an OTB is not to make the numbers look better, but instead its
purpose is to fix an ailing program and establish a realistic baseline for measurement
purposes.
Identifying an OTB in Practice
When we develop our model to predict OTBs, it is helpful to understand where an
OTB fits in and how to identify an OTB. When the government pays a contractor for
work, they pay a contract price. Within the contract price, there are two components, the
total allocated budget (TAB) and the profit or fees. If the TAB equals the contract budget
base (CBB), the contract has not experienced an OTB. If the TAB exceeds the CBB, the
difference between the two is an identified overrun and the contract has had an OTB.
The CBB has two components: the negotiated contract cost (NCC) and authorized unpriced work packages (AUWs). When scope changes occur, the program office updates
the NCC to include the additional work, which causes the CBB to increase. When a
contractor identifies the costs associated with AUWs, the CBB also increases. Therefore,
the CBB and TAB may change several times for a contract, but in this thesis, we are only
concerned with changes that indicate that the TAB exceeds the CBB, which identifies
OTBs and cost overruns. Figure 4 depicts these relationships.
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Cost Overruns vs. Cost Growth
It is important to distinguish between “cost overruns” and “cost growth.” A cost
overrun, as shown in Figure 4, occurs when the TAB exceeds the CBB. Any changes in
the contract budget base (CBB) such as scope changes affecting the negotiated contract
cost (NCC) or the pricing of authorized un-priced work (AUW) do not create a difference
between the CBB and the TAB and therefore do not indicate a cost overrun. A cost
overrun occurs when the budgeted amount for a contract (including revised amounts) is
less than the actual amount spent.

Figure 4: EVM Contractual Price Components (DAU, 2009)

On the other hand, cost growth refers to an increase in costs in comparison to the
cost estimate at the beginning of the program. Therefore, cost growth includes the costs
associated with scope changes, which may relate to the technical requirements, the
number of production units, or any other change affecting the program over time. It is
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possible to have cost growth and no cost overrun, but the opposite is not possible as cost
overruns are a subset of cost growth. Often, authors of cost literature compare current
costs to either the initial budget or the initial cost estimate. These comparisons are
referring specifically to cost growth and not cost overruns. For the purpose of this thesis,
we quantify cost overruns based on the DAU definition in terms of the CBB and TAB.
Logistic Regression Two-Step Models
Analysts use logistic regression models, which predict dichotomous responses, to
determine whether some event is likely to occur. While there are many uses for logistic
regression models, the DoD acquisitions community has benefited from the use of these
models when examining costs and schedules.
When researchers examine the costs of acquisition programs, they are often
concerned only with those programs that are experiencing cost overruns or cost growth.
They often ignore or give little attention to those programs that do not experience cost
overruns or cost growth. Therefore, the variable of interest is dichotomous: cost growth
or no cost growth.
In the past decade, a series of studies investigate the ability to predict cost growth.
From 2004 to 2006, The Journal of Cost Analysis and Management highlights the use of
two-step models to predict cost growth. White, et al (2004) first examined engineering
cost growth for RDT&E dollars within the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) phase. They “illustrate the use of logistic regression in cost analysis to predict
whether cost growth will occur. Given a program has a high likelihood of cost growth,
[they] then use a log-transformed model to predict the amount of cost growth” (White, et
al, 2004). In 2005, Lt Genest and Dr. White “built upon this work and concluded that the
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conjunction of logistic and multiple regression is also warranted when trying to model
total RDT&E cost growth during EMD.” A separate two-step study employing logistic
regression and multiple regression “[concentrates] on cost growth in the procurement
appropriation of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of acquisition”
(Rosetti and White, 2004). In another study, published by the Cost Engineering journal,
Major Bielecki and Dr. White also build a model to predict cost growth. They use a
similar process as the previous studies:
First, the article looks at the utility of logistic regression on finding predictors of
cost growth because of schedule changes [in RDT&E during the EMD phase
and]…. secondly, given a program’s likelihood of experiencing cost growth, the
article seeks to predict the degree to which cost growth occurs. (Bielecki and
White, 2005)
In 2006, Captain James Monaco and Dr. White used a similar two-step approach.
However, instead of looking at the cost of a program, they looked at the schedule. They
used “logistic and multiple regression… to predict if a program will experience schedule
growth and, if applicable, to determine the expected percentage of schedule slip”
(Monaco and White, 2006).
In each of the cost growth studies, the authors employ a logistic regression model
to predict the likelihood of cost growth for a specific category of acquisition contracts.
By doing so, the authors identify a set of contracts that are likely to experience cost
growth. Next, each of the authors builds a multiple regression model and predicts the
amount of cost growth for each of these contracts. This two-step method allows the
authors to focus only on those contracts that experience cost growth, the variables that
influence the likelihood of cost growth and how much growth will occur. Captain
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Monaco and Dr. White employed a similar process to predict the amount of schedule
slips.
This thesis is similar to the previous two-step studies, but this thesis focuses on
step one of a two-step model. First, we build a logistic regression model that predicts the
likelihood that a contract will be an OTB contract. Then, based on our model, we
identify a set of contracts that we expect to be OTB. The second step comes from
Captain Trahan’s thesis. In the second step, we use the Gompertz growth model that
Captain Trahan built to forecast EACs for OTB contracts. This two-step procedure is
valuable in developing better EACs since the growth model that Captain Trahan
developed is only superior to indexed based methods of developing EACs for OTB
contracts. Therefore, the use of a two-step model allows us to focus on OTB contracts,
opposed to looking at all contracts.
Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the concepts of EVM and a few of the EVM metrics,
specifically as they apply to EACs. There are various models used to develop EACs.
Captain Trahan’s growth model is one such model, which pertains to OTB contracts.
Therefore, we developed a better understanding of OTB contracts and the OTB process.
Finally, we looked at several logistic regression models that are similar to the models that
we build in this thesis. In the next chapter, we develop a better understanding of the data
and the logistic regression models used to predict OTB contracts.
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III: Data and Methodology

Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the sources of data for our logistic regression
models. We describe the predictor variables and response variables and explain how the
data must be normalized before it can be used in a regression model. Then we explain
why we chose to use a logistic regression model and how a logistic regression model
works. Finally, we describe the methods used to interpret the predictor variables and
assess the predictive capability of the model.
Data Sources
Since this thesis is concerned with predicting OTBs, we first look at data that
indicates whether a contract is an OTB contract. Second, we look for data that may help
predict whether a contract becomes an OTB contract.
The Defense Cost and Resource Center (DCARC) and the Defense Acquisition
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) databases are the two main sources of
earned value data for acquisition contracts. The DCARC database contains the actual
Cost Performance Reports (CPRs) submitted by the program offices. Since these reports
come directly from the program offices, this data is more reliable. However, the DCARC
database only contains submissions back to 2007. This limits our ability to examine
historical acquisition contracts. Furthermore, if we identify contracts that are OTB
contracts, there is a high likelihood that the necessary data for predicting an OTB is not
available in the DCARC database. Therefore, we are not able to use the DCARC
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database for this thesis. However, the DCARC database will be a good source of data for
future analysis, as more data becomes available in the upcoming years.
One section of the DAMIR database includes the Defense Acquisition Executive
Summary (DAES) data on Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major
Automated Information System (MAIS) programs. This database includes earned value
data taken from the CPRs submitted by the program offices. The data submissions in
DAMIR date back to 1997 and include CPR reports as early as 1967. While there are
many programs in the DAMIR database, only those contracts exceeding the $20 million
dollar threshold requirement are required to submit CPR entries based on the EVM
requirements in the DFARS. Therefore, our analysis is limited to these contracts.
Furthermore, many of the inactive programs in the DAMIR database were undertaken
prior to 1997 and do not have DAES reports available.
For the analysis to be meaningful, we limit the data to contracts in between 1990
and 2005. The acquisition environment prior to 1990 is quite different from the current
environment. Furthermore, there is a limited amount of data available prior to 1990. Our
initial collection of DAES reports includes 10,933 CPR entries from 797 contracts for
177 programs. This includes contracts reported in DAES (electronically) for the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and DoD acquisition programs. For each contract entry, the following
data is available:








program name
program number
program status: active or inactive
branch of service
contractor
type of contract
contract number
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CPR report date
Budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS)
Budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP)
Actual cost of work performed (ACWP)
Management Reserve (MR)
Total Allocated Budget (TAB)
Contract Budget Base (CBB)
Estimate at Completion (EAC)
Program Manager’s Estimate at Completion (PMEAC)
Program Manager’s Estimated Completion Date (PMECD)
Schedule Variance (SV)
Cost Variance (CV)
Percent Schedule Variance (%SV)
Percent Cost Variance (%CV)
Schedule Performance Index (SPI)
Cost Performance Index (CPI)
Schedule Cost Index (SCI or SCPI)

In order to build a suitable model to predict OTBs, we decided to search for
additional predictor variables to consider in each of our models. While the DAES reports
provide useful earned value information, the DAMIR portal includes other data sources.
Historically, many cost studies have utilized the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) as
a source of program and contract information. One section of the SARs, available
through the DAMIR portal, provides information pertaining to production information
and threshold breaches. The production information addresses the quantity of units
planned for, both for development and production, and the average procurement unit cost
(APUC) over time. The threshold breach data identify when specific Acquisition
Program Baseline (APB) breaches occur along with when significant Nunn-McCurdy
Breaches occur. This additional data from the SARs includes the following:
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Development Quantity
Production Quantity
Total Quantity
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC)
APB Schedule Breaches
APB Performance Breaches
APD RDT&E Breaches
APB Procurement Breaches
APB MILCON Breaches
APB O&M Breaches
APB APUC Breaches
APB Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) Breaches
Current APUC Nunn-McCurdy Breaches (current baseline)
Current PAUC Nunn-McCurdy Breaches (current baseline)
Original APUC Nunn-McCurdy Breaches (original baseline)
Original PAUC Nunn-McCurdy Breaches (original baseline)

Finally, additional characteristic data for each program is available in DAMIR.
This information includes:




Program type (MDAP, MAIS, special interest, etc)
Acquisition Category (ACAT) (IC, ID, II, IAM, etc)
Commodity Type (Aircraft, Satellite, Missile, etc)

Data Normalization
After collecting the data, we must ensure that the contract entries (CPR entries)
are as consistent as possible for comparison and use in the modeling efforts. We must
also normalize the data to accommodate for the effects of inflation on the costs reported
in the DAES database.
One issue related to the contracts in the dataset is their duration. While some
contracts may span several months, other contracts span several years. To accommodate
for the different time lengths, we include percent complete as a variable that represents
time. In EVM terminology, percent complete is the cumulative budgeted cost of work
performed (BCWP) divided by the budget at completion (BAC) (DAU, 2009). The
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DAES database does not report the BAC, but we can calculate the BAC based on other
information in the database. The budget at completion is the same as the performance
measurement baseline at completion as depicted in Figure 1 (Chapter Two).
Furthermore, the total allocated budget (TAB) is comprised of two elements: the
performance measurement baseline and the management reserve (see Figure 4, Chapter
Two). The performance measurement baseline upon completion, also known as the
BAC, can be calculated by subtracting the management reserve from the total allocated
budget. Once the BAC is calculated, we can determine the percent complete for each
contract entry and use this as our variable that accounts for the stage at which each
contract is in.
Inflation
A second adjustment accounts for inflation. The cost data reported in the DAES
database is in then year dollars (TY$). However, for comparison, we want all of our
costs to be in the same base year (BY$) so that any differences in costs are related to the
program and not the effects of inflation. The contracts in our dataset use the RDT&E,
Procurement and Acquisition O&M appropriations. The Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (OUSD) (Comptroller) publishes the annual raw inflation indices to convert
dollar figures from one base year to another. The OUSD comptroller also publishes the
outlay rates for each appropriation. These indices are in Appendix A and B respectively.
In order to convert our costs from then year to base year dollars, we apply a weighted
inflation index. By using the raw index values and the appropriate outlay rates, we
calculate a weighted index. Since the dataset includes contracts for the Army, Navy, Air
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Force, and DoD it is appropriate to choose outlay rates that are applicable across the
DoD. These weighted indices are in Appendix C. The base year for this table is 2009.
Combining DAES and SARs Datasets
Since the DAES and SARs reports are in separate sections of DAMIR, it is
necessary to combine the two for use in our analysis. First, for each CPR entry, we
match the program name (and program number) up with the program names listed in the
characteristic reports in DAMIR. This allows us to add the program type, acquisition
category, and commodity type for each program to each CPR entry.
Second, the CPR entries (in DAES) must align with the SARs entries. While
CPR entries apply to specific contracts at specific dates, SARs entries apply to entire
programs at specific dates. To accommodate for this, we apply the program level SARs
information to each contract for that program. Based on the dates of the SARs and the
dates of the CPR entries we align the CPR entries with SAR entries. Since the SARs
reports are less frequent than the DAES reports, we assume that the last reported quantity
(in SARs) is the current quantity until a new SARs report is available. Additionally, we
track whether or not a breach has occurred in each category (APB or Nunn-McCurdy) on
a cumulative basis.
Management Reserve (MR) Missing Values
The Management Reserve Data field in DAES frequently has missing values in
the DAES reports. In order to include MR in our analysis, the values need to be available
for the majority of our observations. When the MR value is empty, we assume that the
last reported value for MR is the current value for the MR.
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Data Assumptions and Limitations
In this thesis, our assumption is that the program offices accurately report the data
in the DAMIR database. This is a reasonable assumption since the dataset is limited to
programs that are required to adhere to the EVM requirements according to the DFARS.
Furthermore, the contracts range between 1990 and 2005 due to the lack of a
sufficient amount of data prior to 1990. The 2005 limitation is to ensure that it is known
whether a contract will become an OTB or not. Since an OTB may not occur until the
contract is far enough along, we do not want to include contracts where an OTB may still
occur in the future.
Furthermore, the analysis is restricted where certain data elements are
unavailable. When the total allocated budget (TAB) or the contract budget base (CBB)
amounts are unavailable, it is impossible to determine whether a contract is an OTB by
definition. This prevents us from using these contracts in our analysis as identifying
whether or not the contract is an OTB is required.
Since we need to normalize our data to account for inflation, we are required to
identify each contract’s appropriation to convert costs to base year 2009 dollars. While
the DAES database does not report the contract’s appropriation, the DAMIR database
includes additional information from the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs).
Fortunately, the SARs identify the contract’s appropriation. However, not all contracts in
DAES are available in the SARs section of DAMIR. Therefore, we do not include
contracts in our analysis where the appropriation is not available in the SARs. The
appropriations in SARs are available for approximately 85% of the contracts.
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Table 4 describes the final dataset that we use for analysis in terms of the number
of programs, contracts, and CPR entries for each service. In comparison to the initial
data set, 14% of the entries are lost due to a lack of appropriation provided in SARs, we
remove 4% of the entries due to them not being RDT&E or Procurement contracts, and
1% of the entries are removed due to the inability to identify the OTB status. This leaves
approximately 80% of the original data set for analysis. Therefore, the largest limitation
is due to a lack of available appropriation categories for each contract. We remove an
additional 1400 entries because they have already experienced an OTB, but this is not a
limitation since the purpose of this analysis is to predict OTBs when they have yet to
occur. Approximately half of the contracts in the final dataset are RDT&E contracts and
half are Procurement contracts.
Table 4: Final Dataset Used in Analysis

Air Force
Army
Navy
DoD
Total

Programs Contracts CPR Entries
28
143
1315
37
137
2326
42
211
2901
7
40
812
114
531
7354

The Response Variable: Over Target Baseline
The next step is to identify the variables to include in our regression models.
Since the objective is to predict OTBs, this variable is our response variable.
Specifically, the response is a “1” if the contract will become an OTB in the future and a
“0” if it will not become an OTB. According to the Defense Acquisition University, an
OTB is identified when the “sum of the budgets allocated to work, plus undistributed
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budget and management reserve, known as Total Allocated Budget (TAB), exceeds the
Contract Budget Base (CBB)” (2003). Using this standard definition, we compare the
TAB and CBB entries for each CPR submission to determine whether an OTB has
occurred.
A second way to determine whether a contract is OTB is to consider the
information the DAES database reports. One data field for each contract is the OTB date.
If there is a date in this field, this indicates when the most recent OTB occurred. If there
is no date present, an OTB has not occurred. Within each contract in the DAES database,
individual instances of OTBs occur when the CPR entry has a bold border. These entries
often indicate the adjustments to specific performance measures and the baseline.
However, there is a limitation to using what the DAES database reports as OTB. This list
only indicates those cases where the program offices identify an OTB within their CPR
submissions. DAES does not identify an OTB if the program office does not submit an
OTB into the database.
For the purpose of our analysis, we use the standard definition of an OTB as
provided by the DAU to identify OTBs. Based on this definition, approximately one out
of every five contracts has experienced an OTB.
Predictor Variables
The main predictor variables in this model include cost, schedule, and
performance metrics. We also investigate the use of other potential predictors available,
such as variables that identify contract or program characteristics. The goal is to identify
those metrics or characteristics that best indicate an OTB. There has been very little
research as to what indicates an OTB. The OTB handbook that the DAU publishes refers
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to a few reasons why contractors update a contract’s baseline through an OTB. We list
these reasons in Chapter Two, but are unable to identify the majority of these items based
on the data available in the DAES and SARs databases. This limitation occurs because
these databases do not provide enough detail about each contract. Based on this
limitation and the fact that there is little research regarding what indicates an OTB, we
consider a broad list of candidate variables to identify the best predictors of an OTB.
Logistic Regression Models
When analysts are interested in predicting a binary outcome, they typically use
logistic regression models. Since the OTB variable is binary, this makes logistic
regression the ideal tool to use. In this thesis, we build a logistic regression model that
takes various predictors, both categorical and numerical, to try to predict whether an
acquisition contract will become an OTB contract in the future. Before beginning the
model building process, we describe the logistic regression function and the parameters
that depict a particular logistic function.
When we plot binary data on a simple graph such as that in Figure 5, it becomes
apparent that a linear regression technique does not provide a good fit. Instead, when
trying to apply regression techniques to binary data, it is preferred to use a curve that
better approximates the data. With a logistic function, analysts fit an S shaped curve to
the binary data, which improves the fit for the model. Figure 6 depicts a typical logistic
regression curve.
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Figure 5: Plot of Binary Data

Figure 6: Logistic Regression Function (Dahl and Vandenberghe, 2009)

Table 5 provides the simplest functional form of the logistic function with one
predictor. Here the outcome is denoted п(x) which represents the likelihood of an event.
The terms B0 and B1 are parameters that describe our model. The outcome in a logistic
regression model can range anywhere from 0% to 100% since the model estimates the
likelihood of an event.
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Table 5: Logistic Regression Equation, Single Variable Model

п(x) = e B0 + B1
1+e

x

B0 +B1 x

It is important to understand what the outcome of a logistic regression model
means. To provide a meaningful explanation, we consider the outcome in this thesis and
explain how to interpret the response. This thesis focuses on predicting whether a
contract will become an OTB contract in the future. If the outcome is an OTB, we assign
a value of one to the contract and if the outcome is not an OTB, we assign a value of a
zero. Suppose we fit a logistic regression model and want to know if a new outcome is
likely to be an OTB. Furthermore, suppose the model has one predictor variable: type of
contract. If the outcome of the logistic regression model is п(x) =.75 where x represents
development contracts, this means a development contract has a 75% chance of
becoming an OTB contract.1
While the previous example of a single variable logistic regression model is easy
to understand, logistic regression functions are often extended to include multiple
predictor variables. In the multivariate case, the logistic regression equation would be
similar to the one in Table 6.
Table 6: Logistic Regression Equation, Multivariate Model

x 1+ B2x2 +…+Bnxn

п(x) = e B0+B1
1+e

B0+B1x1+B2x2 + …+Bnxn

The statistical software packages use a maximum likelihood function to estimate
the parameters (B0, B1, ... Bn) of the logistic regression function. “The method of
1

This is a hypothetical example and does not represent an actual relationship.
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maximum likelihood yields values for the unknown parameters which maximize the
probability of obtaining the observed set of data” (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).
Interpreting the Predictors for the Logistic Regression Model
Once we develop a fitted logistic regression model, we want to interpret the
parameters of the model. One option is to use the odds ratio to identify how the predictor
variables relate to the outcome. With a dichotomous predictor variable (x), the odds ratio
“approximates how much more likely (or unlikely) it is for the outcome to be present
among those with x=1 than those with x=0” (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). For
example, an odds ratio of OR=2 indicates that the outcome is twice as likely to occur
B1

with a predictor variable of x=1. The odds ratio for a dichotomous variable is simply e
where B1 denotes the coefficient term for the dichotomous variable. For a continuous
ΔX * B )

predictor variable, the odds ratio is calculated as e (

1

. In this case, B1 denotes the

coefficient term for the continuous variable and ∆x denotes the given change in units for
our variable. However, this method of determining the odds ratio only applies to one
variable models.
When the logistic regression model includes multiple variables, it may be useful
to determine the effect of each characteristic or variable individually. In order to
calculate an odds ratio for the individual variable, the specific variable cannot interact
with any of the other variables in the model. Otherwise, we would need to calculate a
more complicated odds ratio that depends not only on the variable of interest, but also on
value of the other variables that interact with the variable of interest.

35

Our model may end up with variables that interact to determine the likelihood of
an OTB (our logistic regression response). Furthermore, if the model contains several
predictor variables, the computation of the odds ratio becomes more complex and the
value of the odds ratio becomes difficult to interpret. Therefore, we look at the use of pvalues to determine how important individual variables are in predicting OTBs. When
analyzing p-values, a value less than .05 indicates that there is a statistically significant
relationship between that predictor and the response (assuming a 95% confidence level).
Additionally, the lower the p-value for each predictor variable, the more influence it has
on predicting OTBs.
Assessing the Predictive Ability of the Model
Once we identify the predictor variables in our model, we need to decide whether
the model adequately predicts the outcome. When assessing regression models, analysts
are concerned with the goodness of fit for the model, where the difference between the
fitted values and actual values should be small. We use the “Pearson residual, [which]
measures the difference between the observed and fitted values …The summary statistic
based on these residuals is the Pearson chi-square statistic” (Hosmer and Lemeshow,
2000). Therefore, we look at the associated Pearson chi-square statistic to determine the
model’s goodness of fit.
Another measure of interest in assessing our model is the area under the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. “The area under the ROC curve, which ranges
from zero to one, provides a measure of the model’s ability to discriminate between those
subjects who experience the outcome of interest versus those who do not” (Hosmer and
Lemeshow, 2000). When predicting OTBs we are only interested in those cases where
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the outcome is an OTB. First, we are concerned with the “probability of detecting the
true signal (sensitivity)” which would be defined as the probability of predicting an OTB
when an OTB has occurred (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Secondly, we are concerned
with the probability of detecting a “false signal (1-specificity)” which would be defined
as the probability of predicting an OTB when an OTB when an OTB has not occurred
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The plot of the true signal versus the false signal for all
possible cutoff points is the ROC curve. The cutoff point is the point at which we predict
an outcome to be an OTB if it is greater than the cutoff point and not an OTB if it is less
than the cutoff point. According to Hosmer and Lemeshow’s description, Table 7
describes the model’s ability to discriminate.
Table 7: Interpreting the Area Under the ROC Curve (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000)

If ROC = 0.5

This suggests no discrimination
(i.e., we might as well flip a coin)

If 0.7 ≤ ROC < 0.8

This is considered acceptable discrimination

If 0.8 ≤ ROC < 0.9

This is considered excellent discrimination

If ROC ≥ 0.9

This is considered outstanding discrimination

An additional method for determining how good our model is at accurately
predicting OTBs is to consider how far the models are off in accurately predicting OTBs.
For example, suppose we use a cutoff point of 0.5 and identify all contracts with a
probability of becoming an OTB greater than 0.5. We predict that these contracts will be
OTB contracts and then examine which of these predictions are incorrect. The difference
between the cutoff point and the individual contract’s probability of becoming an OTB
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determines how far off the model is in accurately predicting OTBs. Suppose we use a
cutoff of 0.5 and the contract’s probability of becoming an OTB is 0.55, yet the contract
does not become an OTB in the future. In this case, the model is not far off since the
difference is only 0.05. Instead, suppose the contract’s probability of becoming an OTB
is 0.90 (a high chance of becoming an OTB) but it does become an OTB. In this case, the
model is far from accurately predicting OTBs. We use this process in assessing our
model in the validation phase of our analysis.
Summary
In this chapter, we described our data set and the variables to consider including
in our logistic regression model. We also explained how a logistic regression model
works. Finally, we explained how we assess the model and the variables included in the
model. The next chapter applies these methods to build logistic regression models to
predict the likelihood of a contract becoming an OTB contract.
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IV: Results and Analysis

Introduction
This chapter describes the logistic regression models that predict the occurrence
of an OTB. We construct multiple models to predict OTBs and analyze their predictive
capability and validity to determine which model or models are superior. We are
interested in four primary measures in assessing which models have the best predictive
capability. First, we measure the overall significance of the model with the chi-square
statistic and its associated p-value. Second, we assess the significance of each of the
predictor variables with the associated p-values. Third, we wish to know how well the
model discriminates between properly identifying an OTB and falsely identifying an
OTB as measured by the area under the ROC curve. Finally, we examine how well the
model accounts for or explains the result as measured by R2(U). Based on these four
factors we choose our final models. Then we run a validation on our models to test
whether or not these models do work and whether these models apply to other contracts.
Distinguishing Between Production and Development Contracts
Previous studies modeled development and production contracts separately due to
their inherent differences. In our dataset, there is no explicit identification of
“development” or “production” contracts. However, the RDT&E appropriation aligns
well with the concept of a “development” contract and the Procurement appropriation
aligns well with “production” contracts. We model these two categories separately in this
thesis as RDT&E contracts and Procurement contracts. The initial attempt to model all
types of contracts in one model provided no significant models to predict OTBs.
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Therefore, this thesis models contracts in the same manner that previous cost studies
used, which is by contract type.
Approach to Developing Models
Prior to building any models, we randomly select twenty percent of the data
points to exclude. We reserve this data for use in the validation stage. We use the
remaining eighty percent of the data to develop our models.
We employ JMP® to develop logistic regression models for RDT&E and
Procurement Contracts using three different approaches to arrive at the best models.
Each model uses the variables discussed in Chapter Three as candidate predictor
variables. First, we used the stepwise function in JMP®, with the “mixed” direction,
which is a combination of the “forward” and “backward” stepwise techniques. Using a
p-value of 0.15 for the probability to leave and probability to enter, JMP® adds and
removes predictor variables one by one based on their predictive capability until no other
changes are possible. Using this method, we develop several models, which include five
to ten predictor variables.
Secondly, we attempt a process by which all of the potential predictor variables
are included and then we remove variables one by one based on their predictive ability.
This is a “backward” stepwise procedure. In this case, predictors with high p-values have
less predictive capability and they are excluded from the model one at a time. Using this
process, we develop additional models are that contain five to ten predictor variables.
Since our database includes over 75 potential predictor variables, we make some
modifications to our second attempt to seek out more models in a third approach. By
excluding variables one by one, it is possible to eliminate a predictor variable at an earlier
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stage in the process even though it may be significant in a separate model. Therefore, we
also chose to develop additional models by adding in variables that we consider good
candidate variables. This method is rather exploratory as we continually repeat this
process of adding and removing each of the candidate variables to search for better
models. Certain variables such as the contract type (fixed price, cost plus incentive fee,
etc) and the majority of the commodity types (ship, missile, aircraft, etc) never appear to
be significant when added to the models. Based on findings such as these, the focus is on
adding other variables that tend to be significant such as EVM performance metrics (CPI,
SPI, EAC, etc) and production quantities.
In each of our models, there are approximately 2,000 observations2. When
building each model, we would like our ratio of observations to predictor variables to be
greater than or equal to ten (Neter, et al, 1996). Since there are a sufficient number of
observations, it is possible to include many predictor variables based on this rule of
thumb. However, the purpose of this thesis is to provide a model that can reasonably
predict OTBs and explain why contracts become OTBs. A model with too many
variables gets to be cumbersome and difficult to interpret. Therefore, we limit the
number of predictor variables in each model to ten or less.
Logistic Regression Models for Development (RDT&E) Contracts
Using the contracts denoted by the RDT&E appropriation, we develop several
models to predict whether a development contract will become an OTB contract in the
future. Each of these models contains five to nine predictor variables. To determine

2

This is for both RDT&E and Procurement models. This accounts for 80% of the data, which we chose
randomly for the development of our models.
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which model is the best for a given number of variables, a comparison of the R2(U)
statistic in JMP® is used. R2(U) is defined as:
The proportion of the total uncertainty that is attributed to the model fit…which is
the difference between the negative log-likelihood value of the full model and the
negative log-likelihood value of the reduced model divided by the negative loglikelihood value of the reduced model. (JMP®, 2009)
We interpret this statistic in the same manner as R2 in a linear regression model.
Typically, logistic regression models do not tend to have high values for R2(U). Based
on the R2(U) values for each of the models developed with n predictor variables (where n
is less than or equal to 10), the best model with n predictor variables is the model with the
most explanatory power as indicated by the highest R2(U) value.
Based on our evaluation of R2(U) for each model with a specific number of
variables, four different development models are developed (one model for each of six to
nine variables). The R2(U) statistic ranged from 0.18 to 0.24 and the area under the ROC
curve ranged from 0.79 to 0.83. For our models to be significant we would like a p-value
associated with the Pearson chi-square statistic of less than 0.05. In each model, the pvalue is less than 0.0001, which indicates that each model is statistically significant.
Similarly, each predictor variable is statistically significant when its p-value is less than
0.05. In each model, each variable has a p-value of 0.0051 or less indicating that each of
the predictor variables is statistically significant. Furthermore, the ability to discriminate
between properly identifying OTBs and not is considered to be either acceptable or
excellent based on the guidelines for the area under the ROC curve provided in Chapter
Three. However, the model’s ability to explain the results is low based on the low R2(U)
values.

42

Since there is not much of a difference between the R2(U) statistic and the area
under the ROC curve for each of the models, we choose two models to consider which
have fewer predictor variables. This provides the user with a simpler model with almost
as much predictive power as the more complex models. Each of these models has
slightly different predictors to consider, one with five variables and one with six
variables. The regression results for development contracts are in Appendix D. Table 8
provides the summary output and parameters for each of these models.
Each of the predictors in these models has a significant effect on the likelihood of
an OTB based on its associated p-value. To interpret these predictors, we must first
recognize that the sign on the coefficient term that JMP® produces is the opposite of its
sign in the typical logistic regression equation. By reversing the signs, we can interpret
the predictor variables more easily. The results indicate that Air Force, Navy, and fighter
aircraft contracts are more likely to experience an OTB. Contracts with a low SPI*CPI,
also known as the SCI, are more likely to experience an OTB. A low SPI*CPI occurs
when the contract is behind schedule, over budget, or both. In the five variable model, a
contract that has not experienced an APB Performance breach yet is likely to experience
an OTB. In the six variable model, contracts with a high EAC and contracts with a low
value for % complete are more likely to experience OTBs. That is, a contract that is in
the early stages in terms of percent complete is more likely to experience an OTB.
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Table 8: Development Model Parameters

Development (RDT&E) Contracts
Coefficients and P values
Intercept
Air Force
Navy
Fighter
SPI*CPI
EAC (BY09$)
% Complete
APB Performance

5 Variable Model 6 Variable Model
‐2.12134
‐3.10318
(0.0001)
(<.0001)
‐1.74879
‐1.40268
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
‐1.68322
‐1.61499
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
‐2.09911
‐1.39849
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
4.98886
5.63935
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
‐0.00013
(<.0001)
0.98411
(<.0005)
0.44962
(0.0051)

Summary Statistics
R Square (U)

0.1953

0.1832

Area under ROC curve
Whole Model Test
P Value (Prob>ChiSq)

0.80432

0.79467

<.0001

<.0001

Logistic Regression Models for Production (Procurement) Contracts
Using the contracts denoted by the Procurement appropriation, we develop
several models to predict whether a production contract will become an OTB contract.
Using the same method of comparing various models based on the R2(U) statistic, we
arrive at five different production models (one model for each of six to ten variables).
The R2(U) statistic ranged from 0.18 to 0.22 and the area under the ROC curve ranged
from 0.78 to 0.83. Similar to our regression models for development contracts, all of our
models are statistically significant with p-values less than .0001 and each of the variables
in the model is statistically significant with the highest p-value for a predictor variable
being 0.001. Again, our ability to discriminate between properly identifying OTBs and

44

not is considered to range from acceptable to excellent based on the guidelines for the
area under the ROC curve. However, the model’s ability to explain the results is low
based on the low R2(U) values.
Similar to our case for development contracts, there is not much of a difference
between the R2(U) statistic and area under the ROC curve for each of the models.
Therefore, we choose two models to consider which have fewer predictor variables. This
provides the user with a simpler model without compromising much predictive power.
Each of these models has slightly different predictors. One model contains five variables
and the other contains seven variables. The regression results for development contracts
are in Appendix E. Table 9 provides the summary output and parameters for each of
these models.
To interpret the predictor variables in each of these models the signs of the
coefficients are reversed. Contracts that have a high BCWS and a low BCWP are more
likely to experience an OTB. This means that contracts with a large amount of work
scheduled (BCWS) and a small amount of work performed (BCWP) are more likely to
experience an OTB. Contracts that have experienced a large change in the production
quantity since the initial report are more likely to experience an OTB. A contract that has
experienced an APB schedule breach is also more likely to experience an OTB. For the
five variable model, a contract with a large EAC is more likely to become an OTB. For
the six variable model, a contract with a low value for % complete (early on) and has
experienced an APB performance breach is more likely to experience an OTB.
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Table 9: Production Model Parameters

Production (Procurement) Contracts
Coefficients and P values
Intercept
BCWS (BY09$)
BCWP (BY09$)
MR (BY09$)
EAC (BY09$)
% Complete
% Change in
Production Quantity
APB Schedule
APB Performance

5 Variable Model 7 Variable Model
2.99823
2.45622
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
‐.02918
‐.03368
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
0.03472
0.03724
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
‐0.01627
(<.0001)
‐.00108
(<.0001)
1.92580
(<.0001)
‐0.00117
‐0.00140
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
‐0.73515
‐0.84723
(0.0010)
(0.0002)
‐1.07029
(<.0001)

Summary Statistics
R Square (U)

0.1840

0.2042

Area under ROC curve
Whole Model Test
P Value (Prob>ChiSq)

0.78087

0.80413

<.0001

<.0001

Validation of Logistic Regression Models
Before coming to the conclusion that these models can be applied to predict
OTBs, we must validate their predictive ability. Using the 20% of the data that we
initially set aside, we test the performance of the final four models. Since the positive or
negative signs of the coefficients for each predictor in JMP® are the opposite of what they
would be in the standard logistic regression equation presented in Table 6 of Chapter
Three, we must adjust our logistic regression equation. For computational purposes, we
calculate the logistic regression response by using the formula in Table 10 along with the
values that JMP® provides for the coefficients B0, B1... Bn.
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Table 10: Computational Form of Logistic Regression Equation

x 1+ B2x2 +…+Bnxn)

п(x) = e -(B0+B1
1+e

-(B0+B1x1+B2x2 + …+Bnxn)

For each entry in the validation set, we compute the logistic response, which is the
predicted likelihood that a contract will become an OTB contract. The model uses a
cutoff of 0.5 to determine whether we predict an OTB with our model. If the logistic
response is greater than 0.5, we identify the entry as a predicted OTB and code it as a
one. If the logistic response is less than 0.5, we identify the entry as not being a predicted
OTB and code it as a zero. The validation involves comparing these values with the
actual values of whether a contract becomes an OTB. When the predicted value is a one
and the actual value is a one, we correctly predict an OTB. When the predicted value is a
one and the actual value is a zero, we incorrectly predict an OTB. Table 11 provides a
summary of the validation results for the development (RDT&E) and production
(Procurement) contracts.
We first interpret the results for the development contracts (RDT&E). When an
OTB is predicted (Prediction = 1), the prediction is only correct approximately fifty
percent of the time (Prediction=1, Actual=1). Furthermore, the model frequently fails to
predict an OTB when an OTB occurs (Prediction=0, Actual=1). Based on these findings,
we conclude that these models are not good predictors of RDT&E OTB contracts.
When analyzing the results for the production contracts (Procurement), we find
that we rarely predict an OTB in comparison to the actual instances of an OTB.
However, when an OTB is predicted (Prediction=1), the prediction tends to be correct
since there are very few instances of incorrectly predicting an OTB (Prediction=1,
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Actual=0). While this may appear to be a good outcome, the objective is to identify
OTBs. Since the models fail to identify the majority of OTBs when they occur, the
conclusion is that these models are not good predictors of Procurement OTB contracts.
Table 11: Model Validation Results

RDT&E 5 Variables
Outcome

RDT&E 6 Variables
Outcome

Prediction Actual
Frequency
0
0
592
1
1
27
0
1
112
1
0
30

Prediction Actual Frequency
0
0
580
1
1
24
0
1
113
1
0
29

Procurement 5 Variables
Outcome

Procurement 7 Variables
Outcome

Prediction Actual Frequency
0
0
587
1
1
6
0
1
51
1
0
0

Prediction Actual Frequency
0
0
572
1
1
8
0
1
49
1
0
2

Recall in Chapter Three, that to determine how close the model is to accurately
predicting OTBs, we can consider how far off our predicted values are from the cut-off
point, which is 0.5. When examining the inaccurate predictions (either prediction=1 and
actual=0 or prediction=0 and actual=1), the logistic responses for these inaccurate
predictions are far from the cutoff point of 0.5. Therefore, the cutoff point that we
choose does not affect our predictive capability. Since this process of predicting OTBs
did not produce sufficient models for predicting OTBs, we seek other methods to refine
our models.
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Additional Attempts at Predicting OTBs
One method to try to improve the model’s predictive ability is to limit the data set
to a more applicable period. In Figure 6, the box plot for the value of percent complete
one period prior to an OTB indicates that OTBs tend to occur midway through a
contract’s life. Since OTBs do not tend to occur early or late in a contract’s life, we
attempted to build models that exclude data beyond a certain value of percent complete,
specifically looking at the values of 60% and 70% complete. By excluding data points
beyond these periods, the models still lacked sufficient predictive capability. We also
considered models that only included data points in the ranges of 10-60% complete and
20-70% complete. Again, neither of these models produced significant results.

Figure 6: Box Plot of % Complete Prior to OTB

A second method is to search for trends in OTB contracts. By identifying a
common trend, we can see if this trend exists in non-OTB contracts. Since the OTB
process is not a mandatory process, it is possible to flag non-OTB contracts as contracts
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that were candidates for an OTB. Then we can develop new models that incorporate the
identification of OTBs along with OTB candidate contracts. Unfortunately, we were
unable to identify any common trends among the OTB contracts. This suggests that the
process of identifying contracts to become OTB may be random since the OTB process is
an optional step.
Finally, there is an alternative method for identifying OTBs. All of the previous
models use the standard definition of an OTB provided by DAU, which defines an OTB
based on the TAB exceeding the CBB. However, the DAES database also has a data
field that identifies an OTB when the program office reports an OTB in the DAES
database. When we rerun our models based on this alternative way of identifying an
OTB, we obtain similar results to what we have already found: correct OTB predictions
approximately half of the time and the failure to predict the majority of OTBs. This
alternative also fails to provide better predictive capabilities.
Conclusion
After the initial model building attempts that considered all of the available
predictors, interactions between predictors, and changes in predictors along with the
additional attempts to develop predictive models, we conclude that the models are unable
to predict OTBs based on the data available to us. In the next chapter, we discuss the
implications of these findings.
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V: Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, we recall the purpose of this thesis and the results from the
analysis. We discuss the implication of our results and what policy implications our
results provide. Finally, we suggest some potential areas for future research related to
earned value management.
Thesis Purpose
In 2009, Captain Trahan developed a growth model, which improves EACs for
contracts that are Over Target Baselines (OTBs). To apply this model to improve EACs,
the contract must be an OTB or it must become an OTB in the future. This thesis
attempts to predict OTB contracts with the intent of applying Captain Trahan’s model to
develop better EACs. By improving EACs, cost estimators provide the DoD with the
capability to provide more content to the war fighter. A high EAC limits the ability to
acquire additional capabilities with the additional (unnecessary) funds allotted to a
program. A low EAC creates problems for the program with a low estimate since it will
require additional funds to deploy that capability to the field. Furthermore, when one
program has too low of an EAC, the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.) tend to
borrow money from other programs and this causes problems for all of the programs
involved. In addition to improving EACs, the ability to predict OTBs allows decision
makers to identify cost overruns since an OTB formally recognizes cost overruns.
Summary of Results
We built separate logistic regression models to predict OTB contracts for
production and development contracts and chose four models to use based on an
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evaluation of the predictive capabilities for each of the models. These models contain
five to seven predictor variables capturing EVM metrics, production information, and
threshold breach information. While we were able to develop significant models for the
model building set, all of the models failed in the validation stage. The validation results
indicate that the ability to predict OTBs is no better than a coin flip. Furthermore, the
models fail to predict the majority of OTBs when they occur. Since our objective is to
identify OTBs, the failure to predict an OTB is substantial. Additional attempts at
refining the model based on the definition of an OTB and the period considered also
proved unsuccessful. Based on these results, we are unable to predict an OTB.
However, in one of the attempts, we examine a variety of predictor variables from
the regression models. In this analysis, there were no common trends in these variables
for OTB contracts. This is an important observation as it suggests that OTBs may occur
randomly, which would explain the inability to predict OTBs.
Policy Implications
Since OTBs are not required and contractors conduct OTBs at their discretion,
contractors may not utilize the OTB process when it may be beneficial to them.
Furthermore, the limited number of OTB contracts limits the amount of cost overruns that
the DoD can quantify. Without the use of OTBs, decision makers can identify cost
growth, but the ability to quantify cost overruns becomes much more difficult.
Perhaps contractors could be required to distinguish between increased costs due
to requirement changes and increased costs due to cost overruns or contract performance
issues. This topic needs to be addressed carefully as contractors are less likely to report
contract performance issues and are more likely to report increased costs due to
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requirement changes. One option is to require contractors to estimate the costs of the
specific requirement changes opposed to presenting a revised single estimate for the
entire program when a requirement change occurs. Another way to prevent contractors
from hiding cost overruns in a new baseline would be to require contract changes be
implemented in a follow on increment or to use a spiral acquisition strategy.
The ability to identify cost overruns separately from cost growth allows decision
makers to measure a contractor’s performance. If the DoD can require contractors to
report cost overruns or create an environment that prevents contractors from hiding
overruns, such as with a spiral acquisition strategy, the DoD could better evaluate and
manage contractor performance. With increased visibility into the costs incurred by the
DoD, cost estimators could identify the reasons for increased costs and recommend
actions to control costs.
Future Research
The OTB process appears to be random within the DoD. So decision makers
must ask the question, why do contractors use it? The DAU guide on OTBs explains the
purpose of an OTB, but it does not quantify the benefits realized for OTB contracts. One
possible research topic would be to quantify the benefits of a contract going through the
OTB process versus not going through the OTB process. This would determine if the
process is worthwhile or not.
Additionally, in the process of collecting data, we discovered that the DCARC
database has more detailed CPR data available along with the original CPR submissions.
Researchers should use the DCARC database for studies that require EVM data on recent
contracts since the data is more reliable. However, since the database only includes

53

entries back to 2007, researchers should wait until more data becomes available to
conduct extensive studies.
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Appendix A: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) (Comptroller)
Raw Inflation Indices

(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2009)
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Appendix B: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense OUSD (Comptroller)
Outlay Rates

Table 5-11: Outlay Rates for Incremental Changes in BA Purchases

Outlay Profiles:
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year 7th Year
0.23
0.41
0.25
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.01
Procurement (Defense Wide)
0.44
0.43
0.07
0.04
0.01
0.01
RDT&E (Defense Wide)
0.51
0.40
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.01
O&M (Defense Wide)

(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2009)
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Appendix C: Weighted Inflation Indices

Weighted Indices (base year of table: 2009)
Procurement RDT&E
O&M
21.20
20.95
17.57
1970
22.67
22.10
18.60
1971
24.55
23.49
19.82
1972
26.95
25.43
21.56
1973
29.78
27.94
23.74
1974
32.57
30.75
25.90
1975
35.02
33.35
28.25
1976
37.97
35.86
30.58
1977
41.89
39.44
32.98
1978
46.06
43.54
36.38
1979
50.00
47.35
41.44
1980
53.37
50.61
44.83
1981
56.04
52.96
46.64
1982
58.15
54.95
47.78
1983
60.01
56.85
48.86
1984
61.91
58.54
49.89
1985
64.03
60.32
50.98
1986
66.38
62.53
52.83
1987
68.79
65.06
54.91
1988
71.06
67.56
57.24
1989
73.06
69.89
60.41
1990
74.76
71.96
63.26
1991
76.26
73.43
62.49
1992
77.65
74.63
62.41
1993
78.92
76.12
64.07
1994
80.04
77.61
65.75
1995
81.01
78.92
67.38
1996
81.96
80.04
69.26
1997
83.05
81.05
71.39
1998
84.26
82.29
73.15
1999
85.56
83.78
75.32
2000
87.03
85.19
78.17
2001
88.84
86.74
80.90
2002
91.02
88.75
83.91
2003
93.35
91.21
87.52
2004
95.56
93.72
91.65
2005
97.48
96.02
94.69
2006
99.09
98.01
97.50
2007
100.53
99.66
99.83
2008
102.04
101.12
101.35
2009
N/A
102.68
103.78
2010
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Appendix D: Logistic Regression Models: Development Contracts

Nominal Logistic Fit for Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)
Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
221.5882
912.7929
1134.3810

RSquare (U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
5
443.1763
<.0001*

0.1953
2257

Converged by Gradient

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Saturated
Fitted

DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare
2081
888.05881
1776.118
2086
24.73404 Prob>ChiSq
5
912.79285
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Air Force
Navy
Fighter=1
SPI*CPI
APB Perf (since program began)

Estimate
-2.1213432
-1.7487887
-1.6832163
-2.0991097
4.98886162
0.44961724

Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
0.5481341
14.98
0.0001*
0.1512736
133.64
<.0001*
0.1468049
131.46
<.0001*
0.1732385
146.82
<.0001*
0.6015667
68.78
<.0001*
0.1604091
7.86
0.0051*

For log odds of 0/1

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source
Nparm
1
Air Force
1
Navy
1
Fighter=1
1
SPI*CPI
1
APB Perf (since program began)

DF
1
1
1
1
1

L-R
ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
139.223595
<.0001*
136.948261
<.0001*
153.323909
<.0001*
74.0553979
<.0001*
8.22450541
0.0041*

Receiver Operating Characteristic
1.00
0.90
0.80
True Positive
Sensitivity

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1-Specificity
False Positive
Using Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)='1' to be the positive level
Area Under Curve = 0.80432
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Nominal Logistic Fit for Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)
Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
246.0426
1096.6904
1342.7330

RSquare (U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
6
492.0853
<.0001*

0.1832
2809

Converged by Gradient

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Saturated
Fitted

DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare
2646
1081.4411
2162.882
2652
15.2492 Prob>ChiSq
6
1096.6904
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Air Force
Navy
Fighter=1
SPI*CPI
EAC (BY09$)
% Complete

Estimate
-3.1031811
-1.4026827
-1.6149947
-1.3984851
5.63935418
-0.0001286
0.98410535

Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
0.4946008
39.36
<.0001*
0.139231
101.50
<.0001*
0.1326298
148.27
<.0001*
0.1767598
62.60
<.0001*
107.67
0.5434839
<.0001*
38.27
0.0000208
<.0001*
25.05
0.1966273
<.0001*

For log odds of 0/1

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source
Air Force
Navy
Fighter=1
SPI*CPI
EAC (BY09$)
% Complete

Nparm
1
1
1
1
1
1

L-R
DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
1
99.577974
<.0001*
1
152.01374
<.0001*
1 59.5560043
<.0001*
1 115.885391
<.0001*
1 44.7105976
<.0001*
25.307887
1
<.0001*

Receiver Operating Characteristic
1.00
0.90
0.80
True Positive
Sensitivity

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1-Specificity
False Positive
Using Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)='1' to be the positive level
Area Under Curve = 0.79467
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Appendix E: Logistic Regression Models: Production Contracts

Nominal Logistic Fit for Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)
Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
107.62019
477.20578
584.82597

RSquare (U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
5
215.2404
<.0001*

0.1840
2153

Converged by Gradient

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Saturated
Fitted

DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare
2068
477.20578
954.4116
2073
0.00000 Prob>ChiSq
5
477.20578
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
BCWS (BY09$)
BCWP (BY09$)
EAC (BY09$)
%Change in Prod Qty
APB Sched (since program began)

Estimate
2.99823206
-0.0291836
0.03472149
-0.0010841
-0.0011729
-0.7351471

Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
0.2113997
201.15
<.0001*
0.0037638
60.12
<.0001*
0.0039848
75.92
<.0001*
0.0001488
53.06
<.0001*
0.0001372
73.12
<.0001*
0.2228897
10.88
0.0010*

For log odds of 0/1

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source
Nparm
1
BCWS (BY09$)
1
BCWP (BY09$)
1
EAC (BY09$)
1
%Change in Prod Qty
1
APB Sched (since program began)

DF
1
1
1
1
1

L-R
ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
<.0001*
64.2231264
<.0001*
84.6860049
<.0001*
48.8409568
<.0001*
71.5295638
0.0005*
11.9958743

Receiver Operating Characteristic
1.00
0.90
0.80
True Positive
Sensitivity

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1-Specificity
False Positive
Using Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)='1' to be the positive level
Area Under Curve = 0.78087
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Nominal Logistic Fit for Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)
Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
119.64819
466.27867
585.92686

RSquare (U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
7
239.2964
<.0001*

0.2042
2136

Converged by Gradient

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Saturated
Fitted

DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare
2053
466.27867
932.5573
2060
0.00000 Prob>ChiSq
7
466.27867
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
BCWS (BY09$)
BCWP (BY09$)
MR (BY09$)
% Complete
%Change in Prod Qty
APB Sched (since program began)
APB Perf (since program began)

Estimate
2.45621515
-0.0336802
0.03724202
-0.0162715
1.92580313
-0.0013979
-0.8472259
-1.0702907

Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
0.2135546
132.29
<.0001*
0.0038816
75.29
<.0001*
0.0041528
80.42
<.0001*
0.0026889
36.62
<.0001*
0.3488721
30.47
<.0001*
0.0001473
90.04
<.0001*
0.2239202
14.32
0.0002*
0.2110283
25.72
<.0001*

For log odds of 0/1

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source
Nparm
1
BCWS (BY09$)
1
BCWP (BY09$)
1
MR (BY09$)
1
% Complete
1
%Change in Prod Qty
1
APB Sched (since program began)
1
APB Perf (since program began)

DF
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

L-R
ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
<.0001*
80.1344568
<.0001*
90.5358401
<.0001*
15.7144622
<.0001*
33.6027505
<.0001*
89.0189208
<.0001*
15.7997568
<.0001*
23.7841223

Receiver Operating Characteristic
1.00
0.90
0.80
True Positive
Sensitivity

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1-Specificity
False Positive
Using Will it become an OTB? (yes=1, no=0)='1' to be the positive level
Area Under Curve = 0.80413
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